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Global Counterinsurgency:
Strategic Clarity for
the Long War
DANIEL S. ROPER

T

hough policy initiatives since the attacks of 11 September 2001 have
positively influenced certain agencies and processes within the US government in their efforts to secure America, some steps have worked at cross
purposes and limited the nation’s effectiveness in countering the threats it
faces.1 One entrenched policy that inhibits clear analysis and understanding
of the threat is the continued framing of this global struggle as a “War on Terrorism” (WOT). Words have consequences in shaping understanding and
framing potential courses of action. The broad use and narrow connotations
of the term WOT have cultivated a widespread, erroneous intellectual paradigm for dealing with both terrorism and insurgencies. This false strategy
conflates a single tactic into the overall characteristic of a diverse number of
enemy organizations, who exercise terrorism as just one tool. Continuing to
frame the conflict as a war against terrorism alone serves to mischaracterize
the enemy, obscures an understanding of the techniques they employ, distorts
the challenges posed, and impedes the development and implementation of a
strategy for countering their impact.2
A 2008 RAND Corporation study made a similar observation, noting that “apart from the oddity of waging war on a tactic, this expression sidesteps the causes, dynamics, and shades of Islamic militancy, with unfortunate
consequences for strategy, resources, and results.”3 Elsewhere, in Bounding
the Global War on Terrorism, Jeffrey Record observed that the George W.
Bush Administration, by fusing its challenges and enemies into a single
monolithic threat, “has subordinated strategic clarity to the moral clarity it
strives for in foreign policy and may have set the United States on a course of
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open-ended and gratuitous conflict with states and nonstate entities that pose
no serious threat to the United States.” 4 Record notes that “to the extent that
the GWOT (Global War on Terrorism) is directed at the phenomenon of terrorism, as opposed to flesh-and-blood terrorist organizations, it sets itself up
for strategic failure.”5 To use a medical analogy, under the pale of WOT, the
US effort focused on defeating terrorism has translated into expending significant resources trying to cure a symptom rather than the causes of the disease.
The United States needs to refocus its strategic frame of reference in its effort
to effectively address remediating symptoms while simultaneously mitigating the deeper causes.
One step to effect the needed change in perspective would be to recast the enemy as “global insurgents.” This redefinition is more than simply
changing a label. A change in terms of reference will portray the activities of
transnational terrorists such as Osama bin Laden as supporting a much broader program of activity better understood as a “global insurgency” rather than
just global terrorism. Moreover, focusing the intellectual paradigm on describing the range of activities of the extremist groups gravitating to the
Salafist-inspired cause provides a more exact strategic framework with
which to conceptualize measures to defeat, disrupt, or neutralize their activities. An example of a term that would improve clarity is “hirabah,” an Arabic
word that describes the forbidden killing of innocents, noncombatants, and
dissenting Muslims.6 This term recasts the enemy as a “global hirabahist insurgency,” allowing for a more precise frame of reference as to who the enemy is, what they do and why, and what should be done to neutralize their
influence; as opposed to the current strategically anemic “war-againsta-tactic” paradigm.
Additionally, the continued misuse of the term “jihadist” to describe
Islamic extremists engaged in terrorist activity is both inaccurate and counterproductive. It does not accurately describe the motivation or activities of
the enemy, and burnishes the reputation of those engaged in such acts. This
dichotomy results from the fact that jihad is not “holy war” or terrorism as it is
often rendered in common discourse, but the legitimate intense devotion and
struggle to do good works in accordance with Islam. Holy war as one aspect
of jihad is only justified according to strict rules as rendered by respected Is-
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lamic scholars. This connotation is similar to sentiments expressed in English
to describe extreme devotion to a cause with the compliment, “he is a person
with a mission.” Within the Islamic faith, a jihad is regarded as a good thing
that devout Muslims endorse. Consequently, the extensive use of the term by
westerners is widely interpreted in the Islamic world as de facto admission of
the pious religious devotion behind the acts of insurgents and terrorists. In
contrast, the word hirabah gives semantic precision as to the brutal and inhumane character of the Islamic extremists engaged in the conflict. 7
Why not a “war on terrorism?” Terrorism is a tactic employed by a
broad range of parties on behalf of diverse causes, yet defining it to an appropriate degree of acceptance has been problematic. Setting aside the many varieties of domestic terrorism, this article examines only the characteristics of
terrorist-violence directed against noncombatants by transnational actors,
such as the al Qaeda-inspired global hirabahist movement. This article will
highlight the relationship between terrorism and insurgency, while examining the effectiveness of key strategic policies included in the National
Security Strategy of the United States, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism, and Counterinsurgency for U.S. Government Policy Makers: A Work in Progress.8 A brief
review of the challenges inherent in defining “terrorism” makes the need for
this approach clear.

Terrorism or Insurgency?
According to the 2003 State Department report Patterns of Global
Terrorism, the distinction between terrorism and insurgency is blurred.9 As a
consequence, significant misunderstanding exists in the relationship between
the concepts of terrorism and insurgency, terms often used interchangeably by
policymakers and the media. The terms are not interchangeable. As one RAND
study states,
Not all insurgencies employ terror, and not all terrorists are insurgents. Insurgencies have an alternative vision of how to organize society, and they use various instruments, ranging from public service to terror, to realize that vision.
Terrorism may be embedded in and subordinate to insurgency. But terrorism
may also exist outside of insurgency, animated by sheer revulsion toward the
status quo, without offering or striving for an alternative. 10

Confusion is evident in a number of official US policy documents,
where there are several definitions of terrorism. The State Department defines terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated
against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents,
usually intended to influence an audience.”11 The Defense Department de94
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fines it as “the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or intimidate governments or
societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.”12 The Federal Bureau of Investigation has a third definition, and the
Department of Homeland Security has yet another. To put the issue in perspective, in a comprehensive 1984 survey of terrorism, Political Terrorism:
A Research Guide, Alex Schmid found more than 100 different interpretations of the term “terrorism” (none of which he judged to be adequate). 13 This
lack of agreement, when coupled with differing perspectives, suggests that
reaching a common understanding regarding what constitutes terrorist activity, when applied to a given conflict, is a chimera. 14 For example, the conviction that “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” as espoused
by Yasser Arafat (a terrorist and supporter of terrorism by most any definition) in his 1974 address to the United Nations General Assembly has continuing saliency in the international community. The sentiments behind Arafat’s
statement that “the difference between the revolutionary and the terrorist lies
in the reason for which each fights” have wide appeal, and despite the United
Nations’ passage of 12 antiterrorism conventions, the UN and its members
still have not agreed upon a definition of terrorism. 15
Bruce Hoffman provides clarity to the issue in his seminal study, Inside Terrorism. He stresses that terrorism is a “political concept” and that this
characteristic “is absolutely paramount to understanding its aims, motivations, and purposes and critical in distinguishing it from other forms of violence.”16 Terrorism is “ineluctably about power” and “is thus violence—or
equally important, the threat of violence—used and directed in pursuit of, or
in service of, a political aim.”17 Terrorism is characteristically conducted by
an organization, possibly a subnational or nonstate entity, and is intended to
have far-reaching psychological repercussions.18
The clarity Hoffman provides helps form a broader approach to dealing with this phenomenon, one that enables the student of counterinsurgency
(COIN) to move from a metaphorical view of violent terrorist activity up to a
much broader view of its relationship to other forms of political activity, including insurgency. Reframing the war on terrorism as a war on global
hirabahist insurgency or simply a global transnational counterinsurgency
provides for strategic clarity and a more effective plan for action. 19

Political Activity—The Nexus of Insurgency and Terrorism
Insurgency, like terrorism, is inherently political in nature. Although not policy, the 2007 publication Counterinsurgency for U.S. Government Policy Makers: A Work in Progress accurately describes its political
character. It defines an insurgency as “a protracted political-military activity
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conducted by an organized movement seeking to subvert or displace the government and completely or partially control the resources and population of a
country through the use of force and alternative political organizations.” The
guide describes how insurgent activity is designed to weaken government
control and legitimacy using guerrilla warfare, terrorism, political mobilization, propaganda, front and covert party organizations, and international activity. Significantly, it also states:
A common characteristic of insurgent groups is the intent to control a particular
area and/or population. This objective differentiates insurgents from terrorists,
whose objectives do not necessarily include the creation of an alternative governing authority capable of controlling a given area or country.

Thus, an insurgency is a contest with the government for support of
the people and control over resources and territory. 20
This definition highlights attributes common to both classic regional insurgent movements and those on a global scale. Regional and global
insurgents have the mutual goal of desiring to gain influence over the population. Global insurgents seek weak or failed states to dominate as is the case
with al Qaeda in its attempt to first dominate the Sudan and then Afghanistan.
Insurgents exploit and manipulate societal trends and populations through
nonviolent as well as violent means. They often use propaganda to raise
funds, recruit, and promote their cause among potential supporters, opinion-leaders, and opponents. They seek to infiltrate, manipulate, and disrupt or
discredit governments and societal institutions in their effort to gain control.
Most insurgent strategies involve attempts to provoke over-reaction by security forces, exacerbate ethnic or sectarian divides, and engender violence. 21
Insurgents may use terrorist tactics to coerce and intimidate a populace, eliminate opponents, publicize their cause, and provoke over-reaction
on the government’s part. Understanding the relationship between terrorism
and insurgency helps explain why some insurgent movements use premeditated, politically motivated violence against noncombatants. 22 As Walter
Laqueur posits, “Terrorism is no more than one of several strategies, and usually a subordinate one.” 23 Other analysts suggest:
As long as irregular warfare, including terrorism, remains the only avenue of
action open to the politically despondent and the militarily impotent, it will
continue to be practiced regardless of how many governments view it as illegitimate. Terrorism can be a logical strategic choice for those who have no attractive alternatives.24

In Terrorists’ Target Selection, C. J. M. Drake provides insight on
terroristic thinking. “The strategy of the group is based on an assessment of the
96
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reaction which the terrorists wish to invoke in certain psychological targets in
order to promote their political objectives.”25 Their goal is to delegitimize a
government and legitimize their own cause. Unlike conventional warfare
where the destruction of the enemy may be an end in itself, “a successful terrorist operation is one which, whilst it may result in destruction of a physical
target, is primarily intended to force a psychological target to react in a certain
way.”26 Those organizations that master terrorist techniques become adept
inducing either under-reaction (for example, the American response to the
1983 Marine Corps barracks bombing in Beirut) or over-reaction (the Israeli
response to the 2006 Hezbollah kidnapping of two soldiers) from target
governments—either outcome serves the terrorist group’s purposes by undermining the government’s legitimacy and supporting the terrorist’s public narrative. Ayman al Zawahiri, deputy to Osama bin Laden, hints at the essence of
global insurgency, in which terrorism is just one tactic, in his 2001 pronouncement, Knights under the Prophet’s Banner. He stresses that “the targets as well
as the type and methods of weapons used must be chosen to have an impact on
the structure of the enemy and deter it enough to stop its brutality, arrogance,
and disregard for all taboos and customs.”27 In “Terrorism and Global Security,” Martha Crenshaw highlights a key facet of the threat of terrorist activity:
“The subjective aspect of the threat is as important as the objective aspect.” 28
Insurgencies are not necessarily dependent on terrorism but almost
all depend on external support. The global transnational insurgency inspired
by Islamic extremism is dependent on sponsorship from a broad insurgent
movement. It could not exist without support from organized Muslim “resistance” to perceived western encroachment into the Islamic world. Such support may take the form of safe passage across borders, sanctuary, acquisition
of weapons, and operational planning and execution. Nations that pursue
counterterrorism goals need to understand that transnational “terrorism cannot be defeated unless the insurgencies in which it is embedded are successfully countered.”29
Understanding terrorism as an activity subsumed under a wide variety of activities employed by an insurgent movement provides the intellectual
clarity required to identify the real enemy and formulate effective countermeasures. It is, therefore, inaccurate to semantically equate terrorism and insurgency. In Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse,
Bard O’Neill describes three forms of warfare within insurgent conflicts:
conventional warfare, guerrilla warfare, and terrorism. 30 “Invoking insurgency as the diagnosis of organized Islamic violence, and thus COIN as the
prescription, enlarges the scope of our comprehension and therefore of our response to the general problem of Muslim animosity toward the West and the
Muslim regimes allied with it.” 31 If the War on Terrorism or Long War is in
Autumn 2008
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fact a global transnational insurgency, then global counterinsurgency is a
more prudent approach than traditional counterterrorism. 32 Casting the strategic frame of reference as a global insurgency—an integrated political, violent, and subversive effort to alter the existing political order—serves as a
better predictor or analytical tool than trying to defeat those groups regarded
as terrorists who are engaging in spectacular acts of violence.

Countering the Global Hirabahist Insurgency
Classic counterinsurgency theory tends to assume a binary struggle between insurgent and counterinsurgent, yet insurgencies today may incorporate
many diffuse, competing insurgent movements. In contrast to revolutionary war
theory, these conflicts often lack a “united front.” Likewise, classic insurgency
theory typically regards insurgency as between an internal nonstate actor and a
single government. Today, however, there is real-time informal cooperation and
cross-pollination between insurgents in many countries, often accomplished
without a central controlling authority. The National Security Strategy of the
United States describes terrorist networks as being more decentralized than traditional terrorist organizations; less dependent upon a central command structure; and more reliant upon inspiration from a common ideology.33 Although
parallels—such as the need for contextually specific solutions—exist with the
ideologically motivated Communist insurgencies of the mid- to late twentieth
century, the franchise-like character of modern transnational insurgencies fueled by religious fanaticism is new.34
Counterinsurgency planning in this environment needs to adapt to
changes in the insurgency it seeks to counter, always being cognizant of the fact
that effective counterinsurgency is not primarily military in character, but fundamentally political. Consequently, any effective counterinsurgency strategy employs an integrated array of measures to defeat an insurgency, applying all
elements of power in a coordinated effort to achieve specific political objectives.35 These may include “synchronized political, security, economic, and informational components reinforcing governmental legitimacy while reducing
the insurgent’s influence over the population.” Counterinsurgency strategy is
designed to protect the population against insurgent violence; strengthen government institutions; and marginalize the insurgents politically, socially, and
militarily.36 As Counterinsurgency for U.S. Government Policy Makers: A Work
in Progress stresses, “Effective COIN requires deep and detailed context- and
culture-specific understanding of local and regional conditions, and ultimately
must enable the affected government to gain the support of its population, rendering ineffective the insurgents and their tactics.”37
Theorists have described the counterinsurgent’s challenge as a “struggle for legitimacy” or “competition for government.” Bernard Fall expressed
98
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this in 1965, writing about the Vietnam War, observing that a government losing
to an insurgency “is not being out-fought; it is being out-administered.” 38 Counterinsurgents are most effective when they comprehend the perspective and
goals of the insurgents and the population among whom they circulate. Those
who dismiss the insurgents as irrational zealots acting without a calculated purpose are unlikely to develop effective countermeasures.
The global insurgency described in the National Military Strategic
Plan for the War on Terrorism is a transnational movement of extremist organizations, networks, and individuals—their state and nonstate supporters—
those who would exploit Islam and use terrorism for ideological ends. It
“comprises a loosely aligned confederation of independent networks and
movements, not a single unified organization.” 39 Among these, the movement
comprised of al Qaeda and affiliated extremists is the most dangerous. It
emerged out of the Afghan-Soviet war in the 1980s, fueled by social, political, and ideological trends affecting Muslim populations around the globe,
especially fear of encroachment of western influence. This produced a struggle of ideas within the Muslim world between moderates, who saw the need
for modernization, tolerance, and cooperation with the West, and extremists
who asserted that violence was necessary to defend Islam from aggression
and subjugation including against Islamic moderates. 40
The phenomenon of an al Qaeda-enabled global insurgent movement
has expanded the traditional playing field while reflecting the characteristics
of a classic insurgency. First, though rooted in religious ideology, its goals are
principally political. Its statements overtly declare that its goal is global political change. Although some of these stated objectives may be inflated rhetoric,
significant evidence exists that the message of restoring Islamic institutions to
positions of international power and prestige has been a powerful rallying cry
for would-be insurgents. 41 The goal of the self-proclaimed global jihad is not
simply to topple a government but to demolish the nation-state order in the
Muslim world and build upon its rubble a new caliphate of Islamic piety and
power.42 The twenty-first century phenomenon that has emerged is an evolved
form of insurgency with the political objective having broad appeal among the
global Muslim community.
Second, though the movement does not resemble a traditional centrally
controlled insurgent organization, it exhibits other characteristics of classic insurgencies, combining in a systematic manner violence, political action, subversion, and propaganda in its effort to discredit governments and change existing
political order.43 Through its creative and aggressive use of technology, especially the Internet, it has created a global virtual community and support base.
Ominously, it makes no secret of its intent to make a quantum leap in the ability
to intimidate and destroy through the acquisition and use of weapons of mass deAutumn 2008
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struction. These ambitions coupled with increased capabilities provide the modern insurgent with an unprecedented ability to influence world events.44
Not a traditional organization, al Qaeda resembles a criminal parasite that attaches itself to ongoing insurgencies. 45 An example of this is the relationship between al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Elsewhere, it is
very much a franchise organization, a “loosely knit framework of radical
co-religionists spreading jihad” internationally, motivated by a collective vision to reestablish the caliphate.46 World leaders assert that terrorists in as
many as 30 countries are developing plans linked to this ideology—acts of
terrorism that are not isolated incidents, but rather, part of a coordinated
movement.47
To accomplish al Qaeda’s objectives, bin Laden has declared his intent to “provoke and bait” the United States into “bleeding wars” throughout
the Muslim world, eventually forcing it to withdraw, and enabling al Qaeda to
refocus on the “near enemy,” the apostate regimes in Saudi Arabia, Jordan,
Egypt, and Pakistan. The strategy is to “incite, join, radicalize, and hijack local insurgencies in the Muslim world, while at the same time mounting terrorist attacks in the West designed to weaken any support for intervention in the
region where those insurgencies are underway.”48

A Dimension of Global Counterinsurgency
Paul Pillar offers a useful analysis of a governmental approach toward the global phenomenon. “Sound counterterrorism policy does not focus
solely on terrorism itself (however defined) but instead takes into account
that terrorists have a menu of other tactics and behaviors from which to
choose, and that the conflicts underlying terrorism invariably have other dimensions that also affect US interests.” 49 Researchers at RAND corroborate
that thought.
If the United States were to treat Islamic violence not as terror but as insurgency
that uses terror, it might understand its attraction to Muslim youth. The United
States might then reconsider the efficacy of large-scale direct use of military
force in the Muslim world, which can alienate populations, increase extremist
appeal, and swell jihadist ranks.50

In order to identify root causes and successfully address the threat, it
is necessary to consider multiple perspectives. In What Makes a Terrorist?
Economics and the Roots of Terrorism, Alan Krueger offers a viewpoint that
enhances understanding of those labeled terrorists. “Instead of being drawn
from the ranks of the poor . . . terrorists tend to be drawn from well-educated,
middle-class or high-income families.” 51 They respond to geopolitical issues,
and misperception of their motivation can obfuscate the roots of the prob100
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lem.52 Krueger would avoid the label terrorism altogether and advocates a
more neutral descriptor such as “politically motivated violence.” 53 He takes
this position because terrorism is a “violent and inappropriate form of political expression”54 that “arises when there are few effective alternative means
for an extremist group to pursue its aims.”55 Terrorist activity is not a function
of economics but rather a government’s connection with its population. It is
the enhancement of this connection that should be the primary focus of the
government.
Joseph Nye, a leading advocate of soft power, contends that “in this
conflict, the democracies cannot win unless the moderates prevail in the Muslim world. Hard power may be important for dealing with the irreconcilable
extremists, but soft power will be essential for determining the larger outcome of the conflict.” 56 Former Prime Minister Tony Blair of the United
Kingdom counsels:
The challenge now is to ensure that the agenda is not limited to security alone.
There is a danger of division of global politics into “hard” and “soft,” with the
“hard” efforts going after the terrorists whereas the “soft” campaign focuses on
poverty and injustice. That divide is dangerous because interdependence
makes all these issues just that: interdependent. 57

The interaction between hard and soft power can involve actions
ranging from coercion to economic inducement, to agenda setting, to simple
attraction. 58 The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism recognizes the
need for integrated use of hard and soft power and stresses that any successful
strategy requires all the instruments of national power: diplomatic, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement. 59

US Strategy for the Long War
The US strategic goal in the Long War is to preserve and promote the
way of life of free and open societies based on the rule of law, defeat terrorist
extremism, and create a global environment inhospitable to extremists.
American strategy to achieve this goal is based on an international effort to
deny terrorists resources. This strategy is comprised of three elements: protect the homeland; disrupt and attack terrorist networks; and counter ideological support for terrorism. Protecting the homeland is the defensive aspect of
the strategy, but defense in and of itself is not enough. A successful strategy
requires attacking the terrorists and their ability to operate, to include their
leadership, funding, and communications. The most important component of
the strategy is countering ideological support for terrorism—the “decisive effort.”60 It should be self-evident that countering ideological support for those
Autumn 2008
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who commit terrorist acts is as much a social, societal, and psychological issue as it is a physical one.
The 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism states that
America is at war with a transnational terrorist movement fueled by a radical
ideology of hatred, oppression, and murder. It “recognizes that the War on
Terror is a different kind of war” and asserts that “the paradigm for combating
terrorism now involves the application of all elements of our national power
and influence.” While this philosophy may account for the dynamics and
complexity inherent in combating a global hirabahist insurgent movement,
the Strategy often reverts to the emotionally charged rallying cry of “Win the
War on Terror,” ignoring the fact that while waging a war against a tactic may
be emotionally appealing it is strategically dysfunctional.
Not only do we employ military power, we use diplomatic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement activities to protect the homeland and extend our
defenses, disrupt terrorist operations, and deprive our enemies of what they
need to operate and survive . . . . This updated strategy sets the course for winning the War on Terror.61

While it is not feasible to assess the impact of this approach on the thinking of
leaders and national security decisionmakers, there is little doubt that the
mantra has been pervasive.
The National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism takes a
somewhat mechanistic approach toward fighting terrorism. It views the enemy
as a network relying on key functions, processes, and resources to operate and
survive. These three elements are an important basis for counternetwork strategies. (A function is a specific occupation, role, or purpose. A process is a series
of actions or operations that bring about results. A resource is a person, organization, place, or thing and its attributes. A resource may be referred to as a
node, and the interaction or relationship between nodes is a linkage.) Specific
functions, processes, and resources vary from group to group, network to network, and over time as part of the analytic framework used to identify and describe elements within the enemy’s ever-shifting network of networks. The
Strategic Plan organizes the terrorist network of networks into nine basic components to assist in coordination of effort: leadership, safe havens, finance,
communications, movement, intelligence, weapons, personnel, and ideology.62 While it is important to recognize these components, they may not fully
account for the root cause of grievances. One researcher cautions against this
conventional approach:
Traditional wars also provided clear standards of measuring success in the form
of territory gained and enemy forces destroyed or otherwise removed from
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combat. But these standards were always of limited utility against irregular enemies that fought to different standards of success, and they are of practically
no use in gauging success against a terrorist threat like al Qaeda.63

This caution should not suggest there is little value in using the network model to describe a transnational insurgency, but there are limitations in
modeling and assessing a dynamic and decentralized movement that is connected more by ideology than hierarchy. 64
The United States has implemented numerous initiatives to address
the challenges it faces from transnational insurgency, yet often many of these
actions have been reactive and piecemeal. If historical evidence regarding
counterinsurgency offers any lesson, it is the need for a comprehensive approach and unity of effort. The reality is that, in spite of the numerous strategiclevel policies, the United States has yet to undertake the organizational
changes required to increase its ability to conduct a coherent counterinsurgency strategy on a global scale.65 Such changes are vital if we are to be successful in countering insurgent movements that are not only complex but
dynamic. Adding to the complexity is the fact globalization enables these
movements to behave as “complex and dynamic systems” continuously changing with the environment. “They adapt to whatever capabilities are arrayed
against them, and can therefore be expected to adjust to new and better COIN
capabilities.”66

Global Counterinsurgency
Although the US Army and Marine Corps Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, is designed for use by American military land forces, it has
broader utility in a global counterinsurgency. While not directly focused on the
symptoms of terrorism, it outlines an effective approach to diminish and defeat
politically motivated violence in general. The manual states that the violent activities of insurgents primarily fall into three categories: terrorist, guerrilla, and
conventional. “Terrorist tactics employ violence primarily at noncombatants
and generally require fewer personnel than either guerrilla or conventional
techniques. Terrorist targets do not involve mindless destruction . . . . Insurgents choose targets that produce the maximum informational and political effects. Terrorist tactics can be effective for generating popular support and
altering the behavior of governments.”67 The manual’s limited examination of
terrorism does not diminish the utility of the work, since it spends significant
intellectual energy on militating against the insurgent’s use of terroristic violence directed at noncombatants.
The director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard
University, Dr. Sarah Sewall, posits the Army and Marine Corps counterinAutumn 2008

103

surgency doctrine offers the most strategic approach to terrorism currently
available within the US government 68 and suggests this doctrine should be
central to a broader national security strategy. 69 In outlining a practice of the
good fight, the Army/Marine Corps collaboration provides more than military doctrine. It suggests how to fight and win the “ideological struggle” by
enshrining civilian protection, restraining the use of military power, and recognizing the primacy of politics. The strategy offers the rest of the government an opportunity to recalibrate its approach to terrorism and its national
security strategy. Sewall calls on the President and Congress to establish a bipartisan commission with the objective of crafting a national counterinsurgency policy because the battle against terrorism is part of a broader struggle
to sustain the international system and states within it. 70
Counterinsurgency doctrine stresses a number of principles underscoring the requirement for governments to integrate hard and soft power while focusing on political objectives. These principles are: Legitimacy is the main
objective; unity of effort is essential; political factors are primary; understand
the environment; intelligence drives operations; isolate insurgents from their
cause and support; establish security under the rule of law; and prepare for
long-term commitment. The doctrine goes even further by providing several imperatives for successful COIN. These additional imperatives—management of
information and expectations; use of measured force; learning and adapting; empowerment at the lowest levels; and support of the host nation—are key to any
successful COIN strategy.71 All of these principles and imperatives for a successful counterinsurgency emphasize that soft power is ultimately decisive.72

Implications and Policy Considerations
The United States needs to reframe its strategic approach for the
Long War against the hirabahist insurgency that attacked it. This approach
needs to be capable of dealing with multiple challenges and threats in order to
alleviate the insurgency’s symptoms and neutralize its underlying causes.
The strategy should be clearly focused on the conduct of a global counterinsurgency. This shift in focus requires increased emphasis on actions to better
understand and frame the challenges and threats resident in the strategic environment; the organization and integration of diverse sources of power and influence; and decisive action in accordance with the nation’s values and
interests.
Any enhanced understanding of the environment from which the
global parasitic insurgency emerged requires a more accurate assessment and
characterization of those responsible for and inspired by the attacks of 11
September. This new methodology is essential to the development of a na104
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tional counterinsurgency capability built on a transdisciplinary understanding and approach to problem-framing and resolution.
Creative reorganization and integration of all the elements of the nation’s power in coordination with international partners, private enterprise,
the media, and nongovernmental organizations will permit a more effective
prosecution of national security objectives. This concept may include a reincarnation of the twenty-first century version of the US Information Agency
designed to develop and convey a counternarrative to the extremists’ message
of hate, countering any ideological support for terrorism. 73 Reorganization
will place new emphasis on those federal entities (specifically the US Agency
for International Development and the State Department’s foreign service officer corps) that currently lack the capacity to adequately wield America’s
soft power. The reconfiguration will help harness disparate capabilities and
assist in conveying a compelling narrative to relevant populations. 74
A successful counterinsurgency strategy requires effective and efficient integration of hard and soft power, enabled by a whole-of-government
approach in collaboration with multinational partners, businesses, and the
media. This point is underscored in the June 2008 US National Defense Strategy that stresses the need for “institutional agility and flexibility to plan early
and respond effectively alongside interdepartmental, nongovernmental, and
international partners.” 75 This strategy enhances the nation’s ability to accommodate the global, transnational, and subnational dynamics bearing on
US interests. America can use creative partnerships and processes to establish critical relationships in its drive to achieve unity of effort harnessing the
tangible and intangible influences required for success. Critical among these
influences are those that enhance a partner nation’s ability to deal with myriad
challenges without direct US involvement.

Conclusion
In February 2007, British Prime Minister Tony Blair stressed “the
situation we face is indeed war, but a completely unconventional kind, one
that cannot be won in a conventional way.” 76 Al Qaeda, according to Daniel
Byman of Georgetown University, is “not just a distinct terrorist organization; it is a movement that seeks to inspire and coordinate other groups and
individuals . . . . The conceptual key is this: Al Qaeda is not a single terrorist
group but a global insurgency.”77 The distinguishing feature of this hirabahist
movement is not its simple use of terrorism as a tactic, but rather, the fact that
it “represent(s) a global insurgency utilizing all the tactics and techniques inherent in terrorism, subversion, propaganda, and open warfare.” 78 Prime Minister Blair further advised that “in any struggle, the first challenge is to
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accurately perceive the nature of what is being fought over, and here, we have
a long way to go . . . . For a start, the terror is truly global,” 79 and “if we recognized this struggle for what it truly is, we would at least be on the first steps of
the path toward winning it.” 80 His comments reflect the wisdom from the
Prussian war theorist, Carl von Clausewitz, who cautioned:
The first, the supreme, most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and
the commander have to make is to establish the kind of war on which they are
embarking, neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is
alien to its true nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most
comprehensive.81

The United States needs to refocus its efforts and resources to more
effectively deal with the current global threat. Clear thinking supported by
clear language will assist in this endeavor. American policy should focus
more on denying support for those organizations with political goals inimical
to US interests, rather than emphasizing the apprehension of individual terrorists. Removing the “war on terrorism” from the official lexicon and replacing it with more precise and descriptive terms such as “war on global
hirabahist insurgency” or “global counterinsurgency” would be an important
step in identifying the real nature of the enemy, the security challenges posed,
and the array of techniques the enemy may employ. More importantly, the
change in descriptor will help focus the intellectual framework required to
develop a successful US strategy for dealing with this complex and lethal
problem.
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